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Abstract
We developed a segmented reactor-antineutrino detector made of plastic scintil-
lators for application as a tool in nuclear safeguards inspection and performed
mostly unmanned field operations at a commercial power plant reactor. At
a position outside the reactor building, we measured the difference in reactor
antineutrino flux above the ground when the reactor was active and inactive.
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1. Introduction
A half a century ago, neutrinos were first discovered at a nuclear reactor
plant by Fred Reines, Clyde Cowan and their colleagues[1]. Indeed, nuclear
reactors are the most intense man-controlled sources of neutrinos. A total flux
of 2 ×1020 antineutrinos/s is emitted by a 1-GWth power plant[2–4]. In recent
years, neutrino physics is studied intensively as a means to monitor reactor
operations.
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International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA) uses an extensive set of techni-
cal measures by which it independently verifies the correctness and completeness
of declarations made by countries about their stores of nuclear material and ac-
tivities. IAEA recommends[5] near-field antineutrino monitoring capabilities to
provide operational status, thermal power, and fissile content of reactors to en-
sure the implementation of reactor safeguards. The merits of using antineutrinos
physics are as follows:
• Non-intrusiveness
Because of their high penetration, antineutrinos can be detected outside
reactor buildings.
• No other sources
Because comparable fluxes of antineutrinos are difficult to create without
using reactors or accelerators, one can therefore obtain raw data of a
reactor.
• Information of the isotopic content
By measurement of the antineutrino energy spectrum, one can determine
not only the operational status and thermal power of a reactor, but also
fissile content[6].
IAEA proposed the development of a compact detector within a standard 12-
meter ISO container (approximately 25,000 kg net load) and the aboveground
deployment as medium term (5–8 year timeframe) goals[5]. The aboveground
deployment is very important because of its non-intrusiveness. However, it is
a challenge because of background noise induced by cosmic rays and as yet no
group has succeeded in producing a working prototype, despite several endeavors
among various groups [6–10] around the world.
Taking the above points into account, we proposed a segmented antineu-
trino detector, PANDA, an acronym for plastic anti-neutrino detector array[11].
Because of its segmented structure and its use of event topology information,
PANDA has a strong background rejection capability.
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In the first stage of the PANDA project, we built and operated a small
prototype detector called Lesser PANDA, at the Unit 3 reactor of the Hamaoka
Nuclear Power Plant of the Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. It consisted of
16 modules of plastic scintillators and a total target mass of 160 kg. We had
planned to measure the change in antineutrino flux during the startup of the
Unit 3 reactor, but the reactor was not brought online because of the 2011
Tohoku earthquake off the Pacific Coast of Japan. We measured background
data for two months there. The results were reported in [11].
In the next step of our project, we constructed a 360-kg prototype neutrino
detector called PANDA36 as a tool to inspect and assess safeguards. Over a two-
month period we demonstrated its operation above ground at 36 meters away
from the 3.4 GWth reactor core of Ohi Power Station of the Kansai Electric
Power Co., Inc. The purpose of the experiment was two-fold: the detection of
the change in antineutrino flux between online and off-line reactor periods and
the analysis of background flux from above-ground measurements for feasibility
assessment of project goals. In this paper, we report results of the experiment
using the prototype detector PANDA36.
2. The detector
2.1. Principle and features
We detect antineutrinos via the inverse beta decay interaction on a proton
in the plastic scintillator with the energy threshold of 1.8 MeV.
ν¯e + p→ e
+ + n. (1)
The positron and the neutron which are produced by the inverse beta decay
are detected independently. The positron deposits energy via ionization, and
emits two gamma rays by annihilation:
e+ + e− → 2γ. (2)
It is referred to as the prompt event in this paper hereafter. The neutron is
thermalized in the plastic and captured some time later by gadolinium embedded
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Figure 1: Principle of antineutrino detection with a cross-sectional view of the pillar modules
in between plastic scintillators, and a gamma ray cascade is produced with total
energy of about 8 MeV:
n+ 155Gd→ 156Gd∗ → 156Gd+ γ’s, (3)
n+ 157Gd→ 158Gd∗ → 158Gd+ γ’s. (4)
It is referred to as the delayed event. The prompt and the delayed events are
detected in delayed coincidence. The principle of detection is illustrated in
Fig. 1.
Our detector has four original features as follows.
• Mobility
The target mass of PANDA36 detector is 360kg. It is small as a neutrino
detector. In addition, our detector is loaded into a van, and can operate
in the van.
• Solid state
There are two merits of the solid state scintillator. The first is the easiness
of transportation compared to liquid scintillator. Our detector is fully
prepared in the van for the measurement and can be carried to the reactor
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as it is. The second is the non-flammability. Oil-based liquid scintillator
is flammable and flammable oil is prohibited in many cases to be brought
to commercial reactor sites.
• Aboveground measurement
Sea-level operation of reactor neutrino detectors is one of the greatest
issues for the safeguards application. The previous experiments to detect
reactor neutrinos are conducted in underground sites[6, 7]. In contrast,
our detector is deployed just outside a reactor building. If we detect the
reactor neutrino, PANDA project is to be the first successful aboveground
experiment.
But it is a difficult challenge. Above ground, there are higher background
resulted from cosmic rays. Especially, neutrons produced by cosmic muons
are difficult to be discriminated from delayed events of inverse beta decays.
• Segmented detector
In order to operate the reactor monitor aboveground, a powerful back-
ground rejection technique is needed. Our detector is segmented and the
energy deposit in each module is recorded. So, it becomes possible to use
the event topology information to tag antineutrino events and to discrim-
inate them from background.
Generally, liquid scintillators are used for the reactor neutrino experiment
because they are easy to be doped with gadolinium. But the technique to
create clear and colorless Gd doped plastic scintillator is less established.
Our solution to the issue is to use the segmented pillar plastic scintillators
which are wrapped in gadolinium coated sheets.
2.2. PANDA36 detector
The sketch of PANDA36 detector is shown in Fig. 2. The detector consists of
36 identical modules which are the same ones as were used in the Lesser PANDA
detector[11]. The modules are referred to as the PANDA modules. Schematic
view of a PANDA module is shown Fig. 3. Each PANDA module has 10 kg of
5
Figure 2: Schematic view of PANDA36 detector
Figure 3: Schematic view of PANDA module
plastic scintillator (EJ-200, ELJEN Technology or RP-408, Rexon Technology)
in it. Two 10 cm×10 cm×10 cm acrylic cubic light guides are glued to both ends
of the plastic scintillator with optical cement (EJ-500, ELJEN Technology).
Two of 2-inch diameter PMTs(H6410, Hamamatsu) are glued to the light
guides. The plastic scintillator and the light guides are wrapped in aluminized
Mylar and gadolinium-oxide coated polyester sheet. The polyester sheet is ob-
tained from Ask Sanshin Engineering Corp., Ltd. The sheet is made of 50 µm
thick polyester film sandwiched in two layers of 25-µm thick Gd2O3 coating.
The sheet contains 4.9 mg/cm2 of gadolinium.
Schematic diagram of the DAQ system is shown in Fig. 4. The model number
of each component which constructs the DAQ system is listed in Tab. 1. The
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Figure 4: Schematic view of the DAQ system
Table 1: Table of model numbers of DAQ components
component model number
photomultiplier tube Hamamatsu Photonics H6410
high voltage power supply Matsusada Precison HARb-2N150
16ch discriminator CAEN V895
general purpose board (FPGA) CAEN V1495
A395A, A395C
32ch charge ADC(QDC) CAEN V792
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live time
"OR" of busy signals from ADCs
gate signals to ADCs
~ 7.5 us
live time
Figure 5: Timing diagram for live times
current pulses of PMTs are divided into two lines by passive signal dividers,
where 15% of each current pulse enters a multievent charge ADC (QDC) through
a 30 m delay cable(150 ns delay). The output of QDCs is recorded by a personal
computer via VME bus. The rest of the current enters a discriminator and is
then sent to a programmable FPGA board. The threshold of each discriminator
is set to 150 keV energy deposit equivalent at the far end from the corresponding
PMTs.
The FPGA takes coincidence of two PMT signals of each PANDA module
individually and gets 36 module-wise coincidence signals. The FPGA sends a
gate signal of 400-ns width to the QDCs when there are at least 2 coincidence
signals out of 16 (4 by 4) inner modules. We did not use 20 outer modules for
the event trigger. At the same time, the FPGA records the time stamp of the
leading edge of the QDC gate. The time stamps of both the leading and trailing
edges of the busy signal from the QDCs are also recorded when its state has
changed. The time stamp data are stored temporally in an internal FIFO of the
FPGA and are read and recorded by the same PC via VME bus.
Data from the QDCs and the FPGA are combined based on the common
event numbers which are embedded in the data. The event number is incre-
mented by one on every event independently.
We measured live time of the DAQ using the time stamp data from FPGA.
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In many cases a busy signal is generated soon after a gate signal, and has
a width of QDC conversion time of about 7.5 µs. The busy signals are also
asserted without any relating gate signals when the QDCs are waiting for the
data transfer. We took time intervals for the live time while neither the gate
signal to the QDCs nor any of the busy signals of the QDCs were asserted. The
timing diagram is shown in Fig. 5.
Energy calibrations with 60Co gamma ray sources were carried out on 11th
November 2011 at Hongo Campus of the University of Tokyo. First, energy
calibration of each module was carried out using the Compton edge of 60Co
because the thickness of each plastic scintillator module is not enough for the
total absorption.
In the next step, the total energy deposit for the detector as a whole was
further calibrated using the total absorption peak of 60Co by applying an overall
normalization factor to all the modules since calibration by the Compton edge
is prone to be affected by the uncertainty in the detector model.
The calibration source was inserted from the side into 1-cm-gap slits between
the modules. Three calibration data at center and both ends were taken for each
module.
There is also time variation of gains of the PMTs. We corrected the gains for
each data set using the peak of through-going cosmic muons in the spectrum of
the events in the data set by the minimum chi square method. The relativistic
muons deposit energy of about 20 MeV in 10 cm thickness of the plastic scin-
tillator. The reference data were measured on 11th November 2011 at the same
time as the calibration measurement.
PANDA36 was deployed at Ohi Power Station during the period from 18th
November 2011 till 18th January 2012. The detector in the van was placed
at a standoff of 35.9±0.1 m from the Ohi Unit 2 reactor core outside of the
reactor building as is illustrated in Fig. 6. There were neither cosmic ray veto
counters nor passive shields surrounding the detector. Ohi Unit 2 reactor was
in operation at a thermal power of 3.4 GWth. We continued the measurement
even after the reactor shutdown on 16th December to take background data at
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the same place for the rest of the time of about a month. In the measurement
period, the other reactors(Unit 1, 3, and 4) in Ohi Power Station were not in
operation.
3. Analysis
By the delayed coincidence technique, two kinds of events are picked up by
the data acquisition system. The first kind is referred to as the correlated event,
in which a prompt event is correlated with a neutron which is captured certain
time later by a Gd nucleus. The second kind is referred to as the uncorrelated
event, which is the accidental coincidence of two independent events caused by
natural backgrounds.
Besides antineutrino inverse beta decay interactions, fast neutrons produced
by cosmic ray interactions can form the correlated events. A fast neutron scat-
ters off a proton and gives a prompt energy deposition, then is captured by Gd
with a characteristic time delay.
There is also another type of correlated background which consists of two
cosmogenic fast neutrons produced at the same time by a muon spallation. We
call it double-neutron correlated background. If both the neutrons are captured
by Gd’s and the earlier capture cannot be discriminated from the positron sig-
nal, they could also cause a correlated background. This kind of correlated
background is, however, efficiently eliminated using individual information of
the detector segments as is explained below.
Therefore, elimination of the fast neutron correlated background is the key
issue to the detection of relatively small number of antineutrino events in over-
whelming cosmic ray exposure environment above the ground.
We applied the selection cuts shown in Tab. 2 to the recorded events to pick
up antineutrino events and to reduce background.
There are two sets of selection criteria, “selection 1” and “selection 2”. First,
we picked up the antineutrino-like events by selection 1. But the selected events
also contain a certain fraction of fast neutron background because those back-
10
Figure 6: Location of PANDA36 at Ohi Power Station: the van was actually parked in parallel
with the building wall.
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Table 2: Antineutrino and fast-neutron event selection criteria: Double underlines denote the
difference between selection 1 and selection 2.
selection 1 selection 2
software trigger:
At least two modules in
inner 16 modules deposite
energy of 150 keV or more.
At least two modules in
inner 16 modules deposite
energy of 150 keV or more.
prompt:
3 MeV ≤ Etotal ≤ 6 MeV
E2nd ≤ 520 keV
3 MeV ≤ Etotal ≤ 6 MeV
E2nd ≥ 700 keV
delayed:
3 MeV ≤ Etotal ≤ 8 MeV
E3rd
Etotal
≥
E1st/Etotal−0.5
5
3 MeV ≤ Etotal ≤ 8 MeV
E3rd
Etotal
≥
E1st/Etotal−0.5
5
time window: 8µs ≤ t ≤ 150µs 8µs ≤ t ≤ 50µs
fiducial cut:
The highest energy deposit
is in inner 16 modules
The highest energy deposit
is in inner 16 modules
muon veto:
There is no event with
Etotal > 8 MeV within
250 µs before the delayed
event.
There is no event with
Etotal > 8 MeV within
250 µs before the delayed
event.
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ground events could not be discriminated from antineutrino events by selection
1. Therefore, we introduced selection 2 which is sensitive to fast neutron events.
It should be noted that other background, mainly uncorrelated events, can-
not be fully eliminated by either of two selections because of high background
rate at the surface. Therefore, Ns1 and Ns2, the number of events by selections
1 and 2, respectively can be written as
Ns1 = ǫν,s1Nν + ǫn,s1Nn + ǫB,s1NB, (5)
Ns2 = ǫν,s2Nν + ǫn,s2Nn + ǫB,s2NB, (6)
where Nν , Nn and NB are numbers of antineutrino events, fast neutron events
and other background events occurred in the detector, respectively. Coefficients
ǫν,s1, ǫn,s1, ǫB,s1, ǫν,s2, ǫn,s2, and ǫB,s2 are the detection efficiencies of selections
1 and 2 for antineutrinos, fast neutrons and other background events.
From Ns1 we would like to evaluate the number of fast-neutron-free events
NνB by
NνB ≡ Ns1 −
ǫn,s1
ǫn,s2
Ns2 (7)
=
(
ǫν,s1 − ǫν,s2
ǫn,s1
ǫn,s2
)
Nν +
(
ǫB,s1 − ǫB,s2
ǫn,s1
ǫn,s2
)
NB (8)
= ǫν,s1
(
1−
ǫν,s2/ǫν,s1
ǫn,s2/ǫn,s1
)
Nν +
(
ǫB,s1 − ǫB,s2
ǫn,s1
ǫn,s2
)
NB (9)
Consequently, NνB should consist of antineutrino events and unnormalized
uncorrelated background events, and is free from fast neutron events.
Detection efficiencies, ǫν,s1, ǫn,s1, ǫν,s2 and ǫn,s2, are estimated by Monte
Carlo simulation using Geant4 toolkit[12]. Detection efficiency of selection 1
and the systematic errors are summarized in Tab. 3. A summary of the effi-
ciency ratios, ǫν,s2/ǫν,s1, and ǫn,s2/ǫn,s1, and their systematic errors are shown
in Tab. 4.
The selection criteria of selections 1 and 2 are optimized as follows. First of
all, a software trigger was applied to the data for the both selections before the
analysis. Because the hardware thresholds are not necessarily the same for all
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Table 3: Summary of the detection efficiency and the systematic errors of selection 1: The
detection efficiency of the delayed events is estimated for the simulated events which satisfied
the prompt event selection. The detection efficiency of the time window is estimated for the
simulated events which satisfied the prompt and delayed event selection. The relative error
consists of the uncertainties in the simulation models “relative error(model)” and the PMT
gain factors “relative error(gain)”.
efficiency relative relative
error(model) error(gain)
prompt trigger 28.6% 12.1%(1) —
Etotal cut 44.2% 10.5% —
E2nd cut 82.2% 12.1%
(1) —
fiducial cut 93.5% 5.0% —
total 9.7% 16.8% 3.4%
delayed trigger 48.8% 19.4%(2) —
Etotal cut 79.1% 19.4%
(2) —
E3rd cut 91.9% 19.4%
(2) —
total 35.5% 19.4% 1.0%
time window 91.2% 14.3% —
Total ǫν,s1 = 3.15% ± 29.6%
(1) The uncertainties in the software trigger efficiency and the prompt E2nd
selection are estimated as a whole.
(2) The uncertainties in the three criteria for the delayed events are esti-
mated as a whole.
14
Table 4: Summary of the efficiency ratios and the systematic errors
antineutrino(ǫν,s2/ǫν,s1) fast neutron(ǫn,s2/ǫn,s1)
relative error: E2nd selection(model) 27 % 14.4 %
relative error: E2nd selection(gain) 1.0 % 0.4 %
relative error: software trigger — 33.3 %
relative error: time window(model) 1.1 % 1.1 %
total relative error 27 % 36.3 %
value 0.086± 0.023 1.86± 0.68
the PMT’s, it is required to apply the software trigger with a common threshold
to estimate the appropriate trigger efficiency.
In the next step, we selected the prompt events by requiring the total energy
Etotal to be in the range between 3 and 6 MeV to reduce the environmental
gamma-ray background. We expect that a prompt event consists of one positron
and two annihilation gamma rays. In many cases, E1st corresponds to the
ionization loss of the positron and E2nd corresponds to the Compton scattering
of one of the annihilation gamma rays. Here, E1st and E2nd are the highest
and the second highest energy deposits among all the modules. E3rd is also
similarly defined as the third highest deposit energy. To include the energy of
511 keV of the annihilation gamma ray, E2nd was required to be less than 520
keV for selection 1, and to be greater than 700 keV for selection 2 to exclude
positrons. The double-neutron correlated background events were also efficiently
eliminated by the E2nd cut of selection 1. It is because the prompt event of the
double-neutron correlated background is composed of high energy gamma ray
cascade.
The delayed event is characterized by two or more gamma rays as a gamma
ray cascade with a total energy of 7.9 MeV emitted by 157Gd and 8.5 MeV
emitted by 155Gd following the thermal neutron captures common to both the
selections. Etotal is, therefore, required to be in the range between 3 and 8
MeV for the selection of delayed events. It is rare for the energy deposit to
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be localized in one module because two or more gamma rays are emitted at a
time in the delayed event. So, we expect that E1st/Etotal is not much larger
than E2nd/Etotal nor E3rd/Etotal. Fig. 7 shows scatter plots of E3rd/Etotal vs
E1st/Etotal of the simulation(above) and the observed data(below). As expected,
the events of the observed data are concentrated on E1st/Etotal ∼ 1 because
they are dominated by gamma ray background events, and the events of the
simulation are scattered. We accordingly required
E3rd
Etotal
≥
E1st/Etotal − 0.5
5
(10)
in both selection 1 and selection 2.
We paired a prompt-like event with the following delayed-like event when
the delay time was within a predefined time window.
Due to the conversion time of the QDC(about 7.5 µs), the minimum thresh-
old for the time window was set at 8 µs. The distributions of the prompt-delayed
intervals by selection 1(top) and selection 2(bottom) are shown in Fig. 8.
The dashed lines show the observed data and the solid lines show the simu-
lation of neutrino events(top) and fast neutron correlated events(bottom). The
simulation curves for both the selections are exponentially decreasing with time
because the event pair is correlated. On the other hand, the data curves are
decreasing more gradually. It is most probably due to accidental coincidence
events pairs, which distribute constantly over the time.
Therefore, the shorter the time window is, the higher the fraction of the
correlated events is selected. But setting shorter time window leads to reduction
in detection efficiency. We set the time windows as
8µs ≤ t ≤ 150µs (selection 1) (11)
so as to get high efficiency for the low-rate antineutrino events, and
8µs ≤ t ≤ 50µs (selection 2) (12)
to get high-purity fast neutron events sample of sufficient rate even with low
efficiency.
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Figure 8: Distribution of the prompt-delayed interval: The prompt events satisfied the soft-
ware trigger criterion, Etotal selection and E2nd selection. The delayed events satisfied
the software trigger criterion, Etotal selection and E3rd/Etotal selection. (top) The solid
and dashed lines show the simulated(antineutrino) and observed distributions which are se-
lected by selection 1. (bottom) The solid and dashed lines show the simulated(fast neutron)
and observed distributions which are selected by selection 2. We set the time windows as
8µs ≤ t ≤ 150µs(selection 1) and 8µs ≤ t ≤ 50µs(selection 2).
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Next we focus on the position of the highest energy deposit in the prompt
event. Because E1st of the prompt event is supposed to correspond to the
ionization loss of the positron, the position of the highest energy deposit is
uniformly distributed in 36 modules. On the other hand, the prompt E1st of
the correlated background by the fast neutron is supposed to correspond to
the proton recoil. Because neutron interaction with a hydrogen nucleus at the
neutron energy of 10 MeV has a cross section of about 1 barn, neutrons have
the mean free path of about 15 cm in the plastic scintillator. Therefore, the
highest energy deposit tends to occur in outer 20 modules. However, it should
be noted that because of the correlation with the software trigger criterion, both
the distributions already concentrate on inside 16 modules. We cut the events
whose prompt E1st module are located in outer 20 modules as a fiducial cut.
We introduce a muon veto cut by software. Cosmic ray muons can produce
fast neutrons which bring on correlated background. We assume the event with
Etotal of more than 8 MeV is a muon candidate and rejected any prompt-delayed
event pairs in which a muon candidate event occurred within 250 µs before the
delayed event .
The detection efficiency of selection 1(Tab. 2) was calculated using the simu-
lation toolkit Geant4. The systematic uncertainty of the efficiency was estimated
as follows. We assumed that the systematic uncertainty consists of two differ-
ent mechanisms, uncertainties in the simulation models and uncertainties in the
PMT gain factors. To estimate the uncertainties in the simulation models, ded-
icated experiments with radioactive sources were carried out and the detection
rates were compared between the observation and the simulation. To estimate
the uncertainty in the prompt software trigger efficiency and the prompt E2nd
selection, we carried out an experiment with 22Na positron- and gamma ray
source. And to estimate the uncertainty in the selection criteria for delayed
events, we carried out an experiment with 252Cf neutron source. Because it is
difficult to verify the prompt Etotal selection by experiments using radioactive
sources, we calculated its uncertainty using the simulation result and the esti-
mated energy resolution. To estimate the uncertainty of the detection efficiency
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attributed to the PMT gain variation, we also used the simulation result, but
not experimental data.
The summary of the detection efficiency and the systematic errors is shown
in Tab. 3. The detection efficiencies of the prompt event selection, the delayed
event selection and the time window are affected by the position of the inverse
beta decay. There are, therefore, correlations among them. The relative error
of 29.6 % and the detection efficiency of (3.15± 0.93) % were estimated.
We need to estimate the efficiency ratios ǫν,s2/ǫν,s1 and ǫn,s2/ǫn,s1 to calculate
NνB in Eq.(7) and to evaluate the theoretical expectation by Eq.(9).
The ratios of the detection efficiencies were calculated using the simulation.
The differences between selection 1 and selection 2 are the prompt E2nd selection
and the coincidence time window. Contributions of the other common selection
criteria cancel out each other. Both uncertainties in the simulation models
and the PMT gain factors contribute to the uncertainty in the prompt E2nd
selection. On the other hand, only the uncertainties in the simulation models
contribute to the uncertainty of the coincidence time window cut. To estimate
the uncertainties in the simulation models, we compared the energy spectra
and the coincidence time distributions between the simulation and the observed
data.
The expected antineutrino event rate was thus estimated by the factor of
the first term of Eq.(9). According to a report released by the Kansai Electric
Power Co., Inc., the reactor generated the thermal power of 3.4± 0.1 GW. The
systematic error of the thermal power is not reported, so the very conservative
value was used for this estimation. We assumed in this estimation that the
fission fuel fraction is the same as the SONGS experiment[6]. It is simply
assumed that all the fuel is concentrated at the center of the reactor core as
it is a sufficient approximation[14] for the present experiment. The expected
antineutrino detection rate by PANDA36(target mass: 360 ± 18 kg) is 17.3 ±
6.2 events/day.
20
 330
 340
 350
 360
 370
 380
 390
 400
 410
 420
 430
11/19 11/26 12/03 12/10 12/17 12/24 12/31 01/07 01/14
co
rr
e
la
te
d 
ev
en
t [c
ou
nt/
da
y]
date
reactor: on
reactor: off
Figure 9: Seven day average daily event rates NνB
4. Result
We calculated the daily rates NνB by Eq.(7) averaged for seven days and
plotted them in Fig. 9. The reactor went shutdown on 16th December. The
crosses and the stars show the data during the reactor ON and OFF period,
respectively. The errors shown are statistical only because the systematic error
of ǫn,s1/ǫn,s2 is attributed to the overall normalization of NνB. The horizontal
bands represent averages and error interval of NνB for the reactor ON period
and OFF period.
The reactor ON/OFF difference ofNνB was evaluated to be 21.8±11.4 events/day.
The result is consistent with the predicted event rate of 17.3± 6.2 events/day.
We assumed the correlated background consists of only fast neutron events
by now. We discuss other candidates of long-lived cosmic ray activation products
in the following.
Beta decays of 9Li and 8He produced by cosmic muons could also cause
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correlated background. Decay rates of 9Li and 8He are estimated to be less
than 4× 10−7µ−1g−1cm2 and 4× 10−8µ−1g−1cm2, respectively[13]. Assuming
the vertical muon intensity of 1.0×10−2 cm−2sr−1s−1 and angular dependence of
cos2 θ, production rates of the isotopes in PANDA36(3.6×105 g) were estimated
to be
9Li : 3.0× 10−3 s−1 ∼ 260 day−1, (13)
8He : 3.0× 10−4 s−1 ∼ 26 day−1. (14)
Because the detection efficiency of less than 0.5 % was calculated of each beta
decay by the simulation and no ON/OFF difference in the muon flux is expected,
contribution to the final result is negligible.
Natural radioisotopes 220Rn, 222Rn and their daughters emit α radiation
with the energy range of 4–9 MeV(1–2 MeV electron equivalent). If these iso-
topes permeate into the plastic scintillator, they might cause (α, n) reactions.
Such events could also be observed as the correlated background by the de-
layed coincidence between the α ionization and the following neutron capture.
However, the abundance of the radon near the detector in the open air is ex-
pected to be much less than under the ground, and the plastic scintillator is less
permeable by radon than liquid scintillator. In addition to that, no ON/OFF
difference is expected in the event rate from radon and their daughters because
the radon is not generated by the fission in the reactor. It should be noted that
the prompt event of the (α, n) reaction is rejected by the Etotal cut of selection
1 and selection 2.
5. Prospect
We plan to build PANDA100, an antineutrino detector with 10×10 modules,
as our ultimate goal by upgrading PANDA36, possibly with an intermediate
prototype PANDA64 with 8 × 8 modules. They are expected to have higher
detection efficiency than PANDA36 in addition to a larger target mass because
the escape of the cascade gamma rays following neutron capture is suppressed
with the larger volume.
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Antineutrino detection efficiency of PANDA100 is estimated to be 9.24 %
using simulation by applying a selection similar to selection 1. If PANDA100
were deployed at the same position as PANDA36 at Ohi Power Station, the
selected antineutrino event rate would be ∼ 147 events/day. Background rates
of PANDA100 can also be estimated assuming the same background fast neutron
flux as PANDA36. PANDA100 is thus expected to be able to detect the change
of the reactor status by more than 5σ in a week aboveground and to achieve
the IAEA’s medium term goals.
In order to make more precise measurement of the antineutrino flux, we
have to reject more background events. As discussed in the former sections,
the main source of the background is the “proton recoil – neutron capture”
events by fast neutrons. One of the solutions to the background rejection is to
shield the detector from fast neutrons with water tanks or polyethylene blocks.
Our detector has the ability to discriminate between the prompt events and the
delayed events. So if fast neutrons could be thermalized before reaching the
detector, we would be able to reject the background events of fast neutrons.
6. Conclusion
We developed the prototype of the reactor antineutrino detector as a new
safeguards tool and demonstrated the almost unmanned field operation at the
reactor site for two months. We observed the difference of the reactor antineu-
trino flux with the reactor ON and OFF even with small 360-kg prototype
detector above the ground in the vicinity of a commercial reactor of a power
plant for the first time.
Our detection efficiency of the inverse beta decay is 3.15 ± 0.93 %. We
installed the detector at 35.9±0.1 meters away from the 3.4±0.1 GWth reactor
core. The difference of the antineutrino event rate between the reactor ON
period and the reactor OFF period is 21.8 ± 11.4 events/day. The predicted
difference is 17.3± 6.2 events/day.
Assuming the fast neutron flux measured by the PANDA36 experiment, the
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ultimate 100-module detector, PANDA100, is expected to be able to detect the
change of the reactor status by more than 5σ in a week aboveground and to
achieve the IAEA medium term goals.
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